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CLIMATE EXACTIONS
J. PETER BYRNE ∗ & KATHRYN A. ZYLA ∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Governments at every level need to devise innovative approaches to
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in order to lessen global warming
already underway. They also need to fashion measures to help adapt to the
inevitable and alarming environmental effects. Efforts are underway at the
federal and state levels to reduce emissions from large stationary sources
and from vehicles, and to plan for climate adaptation. However, these
efforts will have little impact on land use development patterns, which drive
transportation choices and reshape natural systems. These patterns are
regulated primarily by local planning decisions, which have not historically
addressed greenhouse gas emissions or adaptation challenges. However,
local governments have significant experience using land use tools to
mitigate other development impacts, including those on environmental
resources.
Monetary exactions are one such common tool that can force
developers to mitigate the climate costs of new development. Local
governments commonly impose fees, a type of monetary exaction, on new
development to offset public costs that such development will impose. This
Essay argues that monetary fees offer significant potential as a tool to help
local governments manage land development’s contribution to climate
change. Such “climate exactions” can put a price on the carbon emissions
from new development and also on development that reduces the natural
resiliency of the jurisdiction to the effects of climate change, such as sealevel rise. Thus, for example, a town might permit development of
residences in a location distant from the town center and not served by
public transit, but charge a monetary fee based on anticipated automobile
emissions. Analogously, if a state agency predicts that the location of the
development will become a wetland due to sea-level rise in the future, the
town could charge an additional fee based on probable loss of future
wetlands. While no jurisdiction has yet imposed exactions explicitly to
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address such climate problems, the strategy is commonly used to address a
variety of other negative externalities and public services needs and
provides a promising legal template for climate concerns.
In addition to describing how such climate exactions might work, the
Essay argues that using exactions to address climate concerns is consistent
with the United States Supreme Court’s constitutional takings framework,
including the Court’s recent exactions decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River
Water Management District. 1 The Essay also argues that exactions are an
appropriate and feasible approach for local governments in our federal
system. 2 It suggests that California provides an especially inviting legal
context for local governments to experiment with climate exactions. 3
II. WHY “CLIMATE EXACTIONS”?
As demonstrated by the global climate agreement negotiated in Paris
in December 2015, 4 the urgent need to reduce emissions of greenhouse
gases contributing to climate change is widely understood. In the United
States, climate change is expected to cause increased water scarcity, more
frequent and intensive heat waves, particularly in cities, sea-level rise and
storm surges threatening coastal homes and infrastructure, and other
impacts. 5 Many of these changes are beginning already, and they are
expected to become worse over time. 6 Emissions of greenhouse gases
produced by the burning of fossil fuels—for example, in our power plants,
factories, vehicles, and homes—are the primary contributors to climate
change. 7 Although communities will inevitably have to develop strategies
to deal with unavoidable climate impacts, it is equally important to lessen
these impacts by reducing the emissions driving them.
Many national and state efforts to reduce greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions focus on the power sector (for example, the Clean Power Plan,
finalized by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in June 2015 8), a
logical place to start given the sector’s large contribution to CO2

1. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013). See infra Part II.
2. See infra Part V.
3. See infra Part VI.
4. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Negotiation Updates COP
21/CMP 11, http://unfccc.int/meetings/paris_nov_2015/in-session/items/9320.php (lasted visited
Dec. 12, 2015).
5. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN
UNITED
STATES:
HIGHLIGHTS
7–9,
14–16
(2009),
THE
http://data.globalchange.gov/assets/4e/16/df9a1659784131dcd1ea020bce19/20page-highlightsbrochure.pdf.
6. Id. at 8–11.
7. Id. at 6.
8. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
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emissions, 9 relatively few sources, and the well-established regulatory
system under which power companies already operate. However, emissions
from transportation make up thirty-three percent of CO2 emissions
nationally and are growing. 10 Policies must also address this much more
diffuse source of emissions. 11
While many efforts to reduce transportation emissions focus on
vehicle technology (e.g., vehicle fuel economy and GHG standards issued
by EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration in 201012)
and fuel content, less emphasis has been placed on the role of land
development in emissions reduction policy. Yet land use drives decisions
about where people travel, how far, and by what mode, and therefore has a
significant effect on transportation emissions. Low density development
with rigid zoning restrictions, better known as “sprawl,” needs to be
severely restricted to reduce emissions. 13 A 2009 study found that
aggressively implementing a full range of strategies aimed at reducing
vehicle miles traveled could reduce on-road GHG emissions by eighteen to
twenty-four percent by 2050, and many of these strategies (e.g., expanded
transit service, investments in land use) are in the hands of local planners
and policymakers. 14
Development not only contributes to GHG emissions, but also affects
the land’s ability to respond to the impacts of climate change. For example,
engineered structures like sea walls can damage beaches and wetlands;
encourage even greater development behind the wall, leading to increased
risks of catastrophic failure; and increase flooding and erosion of
neighboring properties, all of which decrease the community’s ability to
respond effectively to rising sea levels. 15 If we are to be successful in
addressing development’s role in climate change, we will have to address
both its contributions to emissions and its effect on climate resilience.
9. U.S. Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report: 1990–2013, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Sept.
11, 2015), http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/usinventoryreport.html.
10. Vicki Arroyo & Kathryn A. Zyla, Transportation Policy, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND
PUBLIC HEALTH 303 (Barry S. Levy & Jonathan A. Patz eds., 2015).
11. See generally id. at 303–13.
12. Light-Duty Vehicle GHG Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy
Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25, 324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600 and 49
C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536–38).
13. Peter Calthorpe presents an excellent planning study of how promoting walkable, mixeduse communities linked in regional transportation systems can effectively address climate change
in Urbanism in the Age of Climate Change. PETER CALTHORPE, URBANISM IN THE AGE OF
CLIMATE CHANGE (2011). He makes a strong case that such urbanism is “our single most potent
weapon against climate change, rising energy costs, and environmental degradation.” Id. at 17.
14. CAMBRIDGE SYSTEMATICS, INC., MOVING COOLER: AN ANALYSIS OF TRANSPORTATION
STRATEGIES
FOR
REDUCING
GREENHOUSE
GAS
EMISSIONS
(2009),
http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/MovingCoolerExecSummaryULI.pdf.
15. JESSICA GRANNIS, ADAPTATION TOOL KIT: SEA-LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL LAND USE 6
(2011).
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While much is being done at the federal and state levels to reduce
emissions from large stationary sources 16 and from vehicles, 17 these
strategies will have little impact on the land use patterns that drive
transportation decisions. Rather, local policies and planning decisions,
which have not historically taken on GHG emissions explicitly, influence
these patterns. Local governments oversee land use decisions and build and
maintain roads, transit systems, bicycle paths, and sidewalks. They
influence not only where people travel, but also how they travel, and for
how long. 18 In addition, while stationary sources like power plants are
already part of an existing national regulatory regime for air emissions and
other pollutants, it is much harder to get a handle on emissions from many
small, distributed sources of emissions like buildings and transportation,
and much harder to address these sources at a national (or even state) level.
Local governments hold the levers needed to shift development to lower
emission practices, and can do so in a way that makes sense within the
context of their own jurisdictions.
Local governments have significant experience employing land use
tools to mitigate other impacts, including environmental concerns. 19 In
1926, the Supreme Court blessed the use of zoning by local governments in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 20 concluding that the strategy is a
reasonable extension of local police power. 21 Local jurisdictions now
regularly use zoning to minimize environmental harms and other negative
impacts of development. Over time, they have added to this toolkit,
developing strategies like exactions of land or money, and planned unit
developments to provide communities with a greater ability to manage and
mitigate the impacts of land use in their neighborhoods. Local governments
therefore have the opportunity, the legal authority, and access to the tools
needed to drive emissions reductions from development and protect the
adaptive capacity of land in a way that other levels of government do not.
There are well-known challenges with local decisionmaking, however.
For example, competition among jurisdictions for new development and
economic growth could lead to more lax environmental standards. 22 For
this reason and others, there are still important roles for state, regional, and
16. See, e.g., Clean Power Plan: What EPA is Doing, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (July 17,
2015), http://www2.epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/what-epa-doing.
17. See, e.g., Cars and Light Trucks: Vehicle Standards and Regulations, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/standards.htm.
18. See CALTHORPE, supra note 13, 22–23.
19. See generally JOHN R. NOLON, PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH LAND USE
LAW: STANDING GROUND (2014).
20. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
21. Id. at 397.
22. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Richardson, Local Climate Change Law, in LOCAL CLIMATE
CHANGE LAW: ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CITIES AND OTHER LOCALITIES 3, 16
(Benjamin J. Richardson ed., 2012).
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national policies that address climate change. 23 However, these regional
and state-level efforts do not change the unique role that local government
plays in driving development choices.
Many local governments have already taken climate change on as an
issue of local significance. Sixty-six U.S. cities have signed onto the
Compact of Mayors’ 2014 agreement 24 to reduce city-level emissions and
vulnerability to climate change 25 and countless jurisdictions across the
country have developed climate action plans, adaptation plans, or both. 26
These jurisdictions have committed to using the tools at their disposal to
address climate change.
As local governments contemplate the risks posed by climate change,
many may want to take vigorous regulatory action to reduce emissions or
avoid losses from consequent sea-level rise or storm surges. 27 The most
direct regulatory approach would be to prohibit new development that
increases emissions or lessens the capacity of the community to adapt to the
effects of climate change. Thus, for example, a local government might
prohibit development in areas not served by public transit in order to limit
emissions from new automobile traffic, or in areas reasonably predicted to
be submerged by rising seas during the expected useful life of the
development. While arguably effective to meet their public goals, such
measures raise serious distributional concerns. They could render land
previously planned for development valueless or nearly so. Affected
private owners could be expected to wage vigorous political opposition to
protect their interests, and other citizens may see the regulatory “wipeouts”
of such investments as unfair. Moreover, a jurisdiction may not have
sufficient growth capacity in areas either walkable or served by transit nor
the resources to expand low-carbon transit infrastructure.

23. See Alice Kaswan, Climate Adaptation and Land Use Governance: The Vertical Axis, 39
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 390 (2014); see also William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and
the Problem of Institutional Competence, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57 (1999).
24. Cities Committed to the Compact of Mayors, COMPACT OF MAYORS,
http://compactofmayors.org/cities/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015).
LOCAL
GOV’TS
FOR
SUSTAINABILITY,
25. Compact
of
Mayors,
ICLEI
http://www.iclei.org/compactofmayors.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
26. See, e.g., Climate Action Plans: Local Examples, INST. FOR LOCAL GOV’T,
http://www.ca-ilg.org/post/climate-action-plans-local-examples (last visited Dec. 15, 2015);
REVOLUTION
LONGMONT,
Example
City
Climate
Plans,
SUSTAINABLE
http://www.srlongmont.org/examples-of-city-climate-action-plans.html (last visited Dec. 15,
CLIMATE
CTR.,
2015);
State
and
Local
Adaptation
Plans,
GEO.
http://www.georgetownclimate.org/adaptation/state-and-local-plans (last visited Dec. 21, 2015).
27. On land use tools for addressing sea-level rise caused by climate change, see J. Peter
Byrne & Jessica Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE 267–306 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012).
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Such starkly prohibitive measures also may expose the local
government to liability for a regulatory taking. 28 The Supreme Court
construes the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to require the
government to pay “just compensation” not just when it expropriates or
physically occupies land but also when regulations of use go “too far.” 29
Although many elements of the doctrine developed under this construction
are confusing and inconsistent, it is reasonably clear that sudden changes in
land use regulation that impose large losses on a small number of property
owners are at risk of being judged to be regulatory takings. 30 Indeed, in
what might be considered the first sea-level rise takings case, involving the
South Carolina Coastal Council’s prohibition of new construction seaward
of an erosion line, the Supreme Court invented a new rule providing that
when a regulation eliminates all economic value from a parcel of land, it
will be deemed a regulatory taking without any consideration of the public
justification for such a regulation. 31
The costs of litigating regulatory takings claims, let alone paying large
compensation awards, are daunting for local governments, and lawyers for
property owners are well aware of this vulnerability. For these reasons,
land use regulators have sought other means to discourage new
developments that will exacerbate climate problems. 32 One promising
approach that has not yet been applied to carbon emissions or adaptation is
the use of monetary exactions. Climate exactions could condition new
development upon payment for its impact on greenhouse gas emissions or
28. Takings problems arising from regulatory efforts to adapt to climate change are discussed
in J. Peter Byrne, The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property Rights, and Time, 73 LA. L.
REV. 69 (2012); see also James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause:
How to Save Wetlands and Beaches Without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279
(1998).
29. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
30. “In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court’s decisions have
identified several factors that have particular significance. The economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.” Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1165, 1229–34 (1967).
31. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 1027 (1992).
32. Perhaps the most ambitious legislative effort specifically to address reduction of
greenhouse gas emissions from land use planning has been California’s Sustainable Communities
and Climate Protection Act, often referred to as S.B. 375. 2008 Cal. Stat. 5065 (codified in
scattered sections of CAL. GOVT. CODE and PUB. RES. CODE). The Act requires regional
transportation plans to address how future transportation investment can help meet greenhouse gas
emissions targets and provides incentives for localities to plan and zone for new development
consistent with these goals. The Act combines ambitious goals, complex interactions among
multiple state agencies and local governments, and incentives with uncertain force. See Dorothy
J. Glancy, Vehicle Miles Travelled and Sustainable Communities, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 23
(2014); Alexandra Lampert, California’s Fight Against Global Warming: Finally Getting Smart
About Sprawl?, 20 STAN. L. & POL. REV. 193 (2009).
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the jurisdiction’s resilience to the impacts of climate change, and the funds
used to mitigate the impact. For example, the granting of a permit for
development of land that lacks a public transit connection could be
conditioned on the payment reflecting the social costs of the carbon that
would be emitted from the automobiles of the residents; the proceeds could
be used to support low-carbon transit options in other parts of the
jurisdiction.
An exaction can be understood as a required conveyance to the
government of money or real property in exchange for the grant of a
discretionary development permit. 33 The justification for the exaction is
that the government can and will use the property to mitigate some public
harm from the proposed development. The use of exactions in the land
development process dates back to at least the 1950s when local
governments required developers to donate roads within subdivisions in
exchange for approval of the subdivision plat. 34 Exactions became far more
common during the 1960s and 1970s, as discretionary permitting grew to
address public concerns about suburban growth, property taxes, and
environmental harms. 35 Today, despite decades of scholarly criticism, 36
exactions are a ubiquitous feature of the development process, requiring
conveyances or fees to remedy increased traffic, overburdened schools and
parks, and a growing lack of affordable housing, among myriad other
needs. Exactions permit developments to go forward despite their
generation of public harms because they provide the means to mitigate
those harms.
The law governing exactions has grown throughout this period to
reach a current state of maturity. Early state court cases focused on the
power of local governments to require exactions without explicit state
delegations of authority. 37 As regulatory tools, exactions need to address
solely the effects on the public of granting the permit, rather than merely
raise revenue for general public needs. As a consequence, local
governments have to show that the exactions will address some harm
reasonably attributable to the permitted development. State courts

33. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the
Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 623–24 (2004).
34. See R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community
Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 6 (1987).
35. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation:
Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177 (2006).
36. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 465–67, 510 (1977) (criticizing exactions as unfair and inefficient
burdens imposed by cartels of current homeowners).
37. See, e.g., Ayers v. City Council of L.A., 207 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1949); Call v. City of West
Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 218–19 (Utah 1979).
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developed doctrine through the 1980s that implemented this requirement
with varying degrees of strictness. 38
The United States Supreme Court subsequently entered the field in the
well-known Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 39 and Dolan v. City
of Tigard 40 decisions. These cases fashioned a federal constitutional floor
for exactions, requiring that every exaction have an “essential nexus” with a
public harm justifying regulation 41 and that the value of the property
exacted be “roughly proportional” to the degree of harm threatened by the
proposed development. 42
These decisions rejected more easygoing
approaches to evaluating exactions used by some state courts and limited
the flexibility in bargaining between local regulators and developers. 43 But
they also had the effect of cementing the appropriateness of exactions for
many public harms resulting from development, so long as the nexus and
proportionality requirements were met. Thus, the two cases taken together
approved the use of exactions to address the impairment of public
viewsheds, increased vehicular traffic, and additional runoff into a stream
from paving adjacent land.
Monetary exactions have become a particularly important form of
exaction. Rather than conveying to the government an interest in real
property, the developer pays the government an equivalent in money, which
the government then spends to mitigate the public harm attributable to the
development. 44 Monetary exactions, or “development impact fees,” have
grown in prominence because they offer distinct advantages over “in kind”
exactions both to government and to developers. 45 Exactions of real
property may come in parcels that are too awkwardly sized or located to
address legitimate needs. Impact fees can be assessed for a wider range of
community needs than can land exactions, and the proceeds can be pooled
and applied more easily to off-site community needs generated by the new
development. Thus, impact fees play a role in financing new capital

38. Compare Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Mount Prospect, 176 N.E. 2d 799 (Ill. 1961)
(strict test for reasonableness) with Assoc. Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606
(Cal. 1971) (lenient test for reasonableness).
39. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
40. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
41. Id. at 386; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
42. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
43. See Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86
IOWA L. REV. 1 (2000); David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny,
75 N.C. L. REV. 1243 (1997).
44. Monetary exactions as regulatory tools to mitigate specific harms can be distinguished
from taxes designed primarily to raise general revenue even though taxes may be adopted with
specific incentive effects. See, e.g., Sinclair Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 937 P.2d 1350,
1355 (Cal. 1997).
45. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS. E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING
AND DEVELOPMENT LAW 318–21 (3d ed. 2013).
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expenditures necessitated by growth. 46 For example, a large new residential
subdivision may necessitate that the local public school add new classroom
space, but the proposed subdivision may not attract enough families with
children to justify a new building or even a new room, and the developer
may not own land in an appropriate location or have the capacity to
construct school space. But, accepted formulas exist to project the number
of school-age children likely to reside in a new development of a certain
size and form, and the capital costs to accommodate them in local schools. 47
Thus, the developer could pay a monetary exaction based on a per pupil
capital charge that reasonably and efficiently discharges its obligation while
affording the local government flexibility in constructing new classroom
space in what it deems the best location, design, and schedule. 48
An important safeguard is that the funds collected must be segregated
in an account that may be used only to mitigate the harm for which the
money was exacted. 49 Many jurisdictions have legislated schedules of
impact fees, which provide generally applicable formulas or tables of
monetary charges for specific types and scales of development in place of
case-by-case negotiations. 50 Developers may prefer monetary exactions,
and legislative development fees in particular, to in-kind exactions as being
more predictable and transparent.
Until recently, monetary exactions or impact fees offered local
governments another advantage over in-kind exactions: it was unclear
whether the Nollan/Dolan requirements of nexus and proportionality
applied to monetary exactions. Some courts had held that the constitutional
requirements did not apply to monetary exactions, relieving the affected
local governments from litigation risk. 51 However, in Koontz v. St. Johns
River Water Management District, the Supreme Court squarely held that the
general constitutional test for exactions applies to monetary exactions as
well. 52

46. See id.; Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 203–04.
47. See, e.g., Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls. 137 N.W. 2d 442, 449–50 (Wis. 1965).
48. See, e.g., St, John’s County v. Ne. Fla. Builders Ass’n, Inc., 583 So. 2d 635, 637, 639
(Fla. 1991).
49. See, Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 228.
50. See JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 45, at 319–22.
51. See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1229 (Fla. 2011),
rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (collecting cases).
52. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603 (2013). Koontz did
not address whether the heightened scrutiny of Nollan/Dolan applies to legislatively scheduled
impact fees. Some state courts have held that such pre-established fees do not require such
scrutiny because they are not bargained for and thus are less subject to the risk of “extortion.”
See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 929 (1996);
Homebuilders Ass’n of Central Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 902 P.2d 1347 (Ariz. App. 1995),
aff’d, 930 P.2d 993 (Ariz.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1120 (1997). The analysis in this Essay
assumes that Nollan/Dolan will apply to climate exactions.
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Koontz did not change the substance of the Court’s test for exactions.
When challenged, local governments need only show that the monetary
exactions they have demanded bear an essential nexus to the grounds for
regulation and that the money sought is roughly proportional to the harm
predicted from the development. The Court’s opinion justifies its
application to exactions of money on the reasonable concern that regulators
can too easily evade Nollan and Dolan by obtaining money in place of an
interest in real property. 53 But the Court did not suggest any increase in the
burden on local governments in meeting those requirements. Importantly,
Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court affirms the value of exactions more
forcefully than any prior Court opinion. The opinion expressly stated,
“Insisting that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their
conduct is a hallmark of responsible land-use policy, and we have long
sustained such regulations against constitutional attack.” 54 The Court
reiterated its concern about what it had termed “extortion” in prior cases,
explaining that its concern focused on the ability of government to leverage
its control over discretionary permits to obtain property unrelated to
legitimate concerns about public harms attributable to the new
development. 55 Reiterating that regulators can insist that “applicants bear
the full costs of their proposals,” the Court concluded: “Under Nollan and
Dolan the government may choose whether and how a permit applicant is
required to mitigate the impacts of a proposed development, but it may not
leverage its legitimate interest in mitigation to pursue governmental ends
that lack an essential nexus and rough proportionality to those impacts.”56
Koontz has been the subject of some withering scholarly criticism as
an undue and vague extension of the Court’s prior exactions doctrine. 57
Although some of that criticism seems warranted, this Essay will argue that
Koontz does not pose a significant barrier to the use of climate exactions.
The most problematic part of the Court’s opinion addresses the extension of
Nollan and Dolan to “demands” for exactions that arise in negotiations
between regulators and developers but are never made explicit conditions
for the grant of permit. 58 Both the reach and rationale for this extension
seem problematic. 59 But that holding poses no special risk for climate

53. Id. at 2598–99.
54. Id. at 2595.
55. Id. at 2594–95.
56. Id. at 2595.
57. See John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2014); Lee Anne Fennell & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Exactions Creep, 2013 SUP. CT.
REV. 287 (2014).
58. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598.
59. The Court declined to determine whether the discussions between the government and
Koontz reached the level of a “demand” for payment, potentially exposing all sorts of negotiations
to exactions analysis. Local governments may want to structure their exactions process in order to
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exactions. Rather, climate exactions fall squarely within the Court’s
approval of monetary exactions that mitigate public harms. 60 They can be
structured to avoid the undue “leverage” that the Court identified as the
rights violation it acted to prevent, and also to operate with transparency.
Indeed, as this Essay will show, climate exactions can be assessed
following established formulas that provide objective calculation of
proportionality.
III. APPLYING A “CLIMATE EXACTION”
It is helpful to consider how a climate exaction might work in practice
and how well these strategies would stand up to the Nollan and Dolan tests.
This Section will suggest ways in which exactions might be used to address
both emissions and loss of adaptive capacity caused by development.
A. Climate Exactions to Address GHG Emissions
In the emissions context, developers of large new residential and
commercial buildings might be charged a climate exaction based on the
calculated “emissions impact” of the development. For example, the
development may be found to generate substantial new automobile travel and
therefore increased emissions from driving, or to consume significant
amounts of electricity on-site, leading to increased energy-sector emissions.
The jurisdiction could place a fee on these emissions (or perhaps the
emissions in excess of an expected or ideal baseline) and then use the fee to
invest in infrastructure to encourage more walking and biking within the
community in order to offset the emissions caused by increased motor vehicle
traffic. The jurisdiction might also be interested in applying the fee to energy
efficiency programs in the jurisdiction in order to offset the emissions caused
by energy use in the new building itself. In either case, the use of a monetary
exaction allows the jurisdiction to pool funds received from multiple projects
to make broader infrastructure investments (like improved transit service) that
benefit the community in ways that individual on-site mitigation projects
could not.
1. Demonstrating an Essential Nexus for an Emissions Fee
In contrast to exactions of land, development fees offer the flexibility
to identify the most cost effective mitigation investments wherever they
occur. However, this flexibility may raise questions about whether a
geographically distant mitigation project bears a strong enough nexus to the
impact caused by the development (i.e., whether it is truly mitigating the
permit a robust give and take with applicants before reaching a final determination of necessary
conditions, for example, by separating staff discussions with the applicant from agency decisions.
60. See infra Part III.
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harm imposed). That said, GHG emissions may offer a clearer nexus
between impact and mitigation activity than other measures currently used
to calculate impact fees, even if the mitigation project occurs elsewhere in
the jurisdiction.
Planners are fairly comfortable imposing an impact fee on
developments to fund transportation projects that will directly mitigate
increased traffic caused by the development. 61 The nexus analysis becomes
more complicated if the transportation mitigation project occurs elsewhere
in the jurisdiction and cannot be claimed to offset the specific traffic issues
caused by the development. That said, courts have been flexible with the
scope of the nexus, as long as one can be demonstrated. In Commercial
Builders of Northern California v. City of Sacramento, 62 the Ninth Circuit
rejected a builder’s argument that an ordinance can only be upheld under
Nollan if it can be shown that the development is directly responsible for
the impact the exaction is designed to address. 63 For a fee imposed to
mitigate a development’s GHG emissions, the location of the mitigation
project and the source of emissions reduced matter less than a fee based on
infrastructure demand. Because climate change is a global problem, and
GHGs mix uniformly in the atmosphere, it makes little difference
scientifically where emissions occur or from what type of source (e.g.,
carbon dioxide emissions from transportation are no different from those
from buildings). 64 Emissions increases in one part of town can be “offset”
by emissions reductions elsewhere, without concern for the local public
health impacts that more traditional pollutants can cause. 65 In that sense,
GHG emissions mitigation projects offset the direct impact of the
development no matter where in the jurisdiction they occur, and arguably
might not have to happen within the jurisdiction at all, although a
community may prefer to invest locally.
A local government provides a logical boundary within which to
reduce net emissions. As mentioned above, many communities have

61. NANCY W. VERBER, DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES: AN OVERVIEW (2004),
http://www.impactfees.com/publications%20pdf/impactFeepres.pdf (listing roadway facilities as
one of the “fee-eligible public facilities frequently named in state laws”).
62. 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
63. Id. at 875 (holding that when “a detailed study revealed a substantial connection between
development and the problem to be addressed, the Ordinance does not suffer from the infirmities
that the Supreme Court disapproved in Nollan”).
64. A. DENNY ELLERMAN, PAUL L. JOSKOW & DAVID HARRISON, JR., PEW CTR. ON
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE U.S.: EXPERIENCE, LESSONS, AND
CONSIDERATIONS
FOR
GREENHOUSE
GASES
46
(2003),
http://www.c2es.org/publications/emissions-trading-us-experience-lessons-and-considerationsgreenhouse-gases.
65. Id. at 8.
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already set jurisdiction-wide GHG emissions reduction goals. 66 In these
cases, the entity that would be imposing the fee (the local government)
aligns with the geographic area in which mitigation strategies would occur,
providing for a relatively straightforward administration of the program.
There are also economic reasons to allow the mitigation to take place
anywhere within the jurisdiction—it can be far more affordable to achieve
GHG reductions across a wider geographic area than in a facility-by-facility
manner. 67 By pooling mitigation fees instead of requiring each developer to
provide on-site mitigation, the jurisdiction can make the best use of funds
by directing them to the most cost-effective reduction opportunities. As
long as the community identifies a governmental interest in reducing GHG
emissions, something many jurisdictions have done through formal
processes to develop Climate Action Plans, 68 and provides assurances that
fees collected will be spent to reduce emissions within the jurisdiction, the
nexus test would seem to be satisfied. 69
2. Demonstrating Rough Proportionality for an Emissions Fee
The rough proportionality test asks whether exaction is related “both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”70 In order to
pass the rough proportionality test, local officials would have to show that
approximately the same level of emissions would be reduced by the
mitigation effort as would be increased by the development project.
Conveniently, for GHG emissions, this is relatively easy to do.
A strategy that quantified GHG emissions resulting from the traffic
impacts of a development would most closely resemble the impact fees
local governments currently impose. However, there is no legal reason to
limit the emissions analysis to the gases resulting from transportation, as
long as a nexus can be shown between the mitigation strategy (the climate
change impact of emissions from building energy use is identical to those
from transportation) and the development. Therefore, local officials might
also calculate the contribution that the development makes to emissions

66. See, e.g., Local Examples of Climate Action, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www3.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/local/local-examples.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2015)
(listing local jurisdictions that have created climate change action plans).
67. ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 64, at iii.
68. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 66.
69. To demonstrate that the nexus is truly in place, it would likely be important for
communities to isolate funds collected for a given impact so that they can be spent explicitly for
mitigation purposes, rather than commingling the revenue with general funds that may or may not
go to mitigation purposes. VERBER, supra note 61 (listing segregated funds as a key element of
state legislation enabling impact fees).
70. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
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from its energy use or other sources. Approaches to each of these are
discussed below. 71
a. Rough Proportionality: Transportation Emissions
Planners talk about quantifying both the direct and indirect impacts of
development. While it may be hard to estimate the number of residents in a
new development who would use a new bicycle lane (a direct impact), or to
estimate the number of cyclists that would be necessary to mitigate the
increased traffic congestion caused by a development (an indirect impact),
it is relatively easy to quantify the GHG emissions associated with
increased traffic, and even to estimate the reductions that could be achieved
by investing in bicycling and walking infrastructure. Planners already
estimate the traffic impacts of new development in order to establish
entirely uncontroversial development fees to improve road infrastructure.
Travel demand forecasting models or sketch planning tools analyze the
impacts of a given development project on the transportation system. 72 In
order to calculate the GHG emissions associated with that travel, the travel
forecast can then be fed into a transportation GHG modeling tool. A report
prepared for the American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials recommends using MOVES, (the “Motor Vehicle
Emissions Simulator”), 73 a tool produced by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency—and already used nationwide to estimate emissions of
other pollutants from transportation sources—for this purpose. 74
Traditional transportation impact fees use metrics like level of service
(“LOS”), which identify the infrastructure service the local government will
provide the community (e.g., X miles of road per capita), and then impose a
fee on the development to cover the incremental infrastructure needed to
maintain that LOS. 75 Recently, some progressive jurisdictions have started
71. A topic deserving further research is the baseline that should be employed to calculate the
GHG emission upon which the climate exaction should be calculated. Of course, even the
greenest new residential development will generate some emissions from transportation or energy
use, and a climate conscious local government might want not to discourage any such
development with a fee. One might hypothesize that a climate exaction should be calculated only
upon emissions in excess of an average building, or from transit-oriented development using
current best practices for energy efficiency. On the other hand, a rigorous land use policy may
strive to discourage and mitigate all emissions that contribute to global warming.
72. ICF CONSULTING, ASSESSMENT OF GREENHOUSE GAS ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES FOR
TRANSPORTATION
PROJECTS
21
(2006),
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/archive/NotesDocs/25-25(17)_FR.pdf.
73. Id.
74. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, USING MOVES FOR ESTIMATING STATE AND LOCAL
INVENTORIES OF ON-ROAD GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND ENERGY CONSUMPTION 5 (2012),
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/stateresources/420b12068.pdf.
75. PETER N. BROWN & GRAHAM LYONS, CITY ATTORNEYS DEPT., LEAGUE OF CAL.
CITIES, A SHORT OVERVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES 7–9 (2003), http://www.cailg.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/resources__overviewimpactfees.pdf.
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to develop multi-modal LOSs in addition to automobile-focused LOSs. 76
However, using GHGs instead of some version of LOS might simplify the
calculation and the legal analysis by providing a standard metric that
applies to all development projects and mitigation efforts. 77
b. Rough Proportionality: Nontransportation Emissions
The prototypical development fee addresses a development’s impact on
traffic. However, if the concern is GHG emissions, any given development
will also be responsible for emissions from its own energy use, and
jurisdictions might consider requiring developers to offset these emissions as
well. There is precedent for development fees to support green building
initiatives. Arlington County, Virginia, imposes a fee on development
projects to support the county’s green building educational fund; and Eagle
County, Colorado rebates permit fees for residential projects that exceed
green building standards, and they imposes additional fees on projects that do
not. 78 Professor Carl Circo has proposed greater use of this tool to promote
energy efficient buildings, on the ground that green building projects “serve
the public health and general welfare in the same way that environmental
regulations do. “ 79 However, as with transportation, GHG emissions provide
a way to use environmental regulation to achieve energy efficiency goals, and
with an already standardized metric. Conveniently, GHG emissions from
building energy consumption are even easier to calculate than induced
transportation emissions.
In 2001, the World Resources Institute and the World Business
Council for Sustainable Development released the first edition of the
“Greenhouse Gas Protocol,” an accounting framework that now serves as

76. Sarah Peters, Impact Fees for Complete Streets: A Comprehensive Project Submitted in
Partial Satisfaction of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in Urban Planning 3 (2012)
(unpublished
M.A.
thesis,
University
of
California,
Los
Angeles),
http://164.67.121.27/files/Lewis_Center/CompleteStreetsInitiative/Peters_report.pdf.
77. The Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) has recommended that California
replace the LOS metric used for environmental impact analysis with vehicle miles traveled
(“VMT”). Letter from Amanda Eaken, Deputy Dir. Sustainable Communities, & Justin Horner,
Policy Analyst, NRDC, to Christopher Calfee, Senior Counsel, Governor’s Office of Planning and
Research (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.opr.ca.gov/docs/NRDC_LOS2-13.pdf. As NRDC notes,
VMT would better reflect the environmental impact of transportation, in much the same way that
GHG emissions would. Id. GHG emissions, however, offer a metric that can be standardized
across multiple emissions sources, rather than just transportation. In addition, a VMT metric
would not reflect the environmental benefit of driving more fuel efficient (or non-emitting)
vehicles, while a GHG metric would. On the other hand, VMT may be a more politically
palatable choice than GHG emissions.
78. Carl J. Circo, Should Owners and Developers of Low-Performance Buildings Pay Impact
or Mitigation Fees to Finance Green Building Incentive Programs and Other Sustainable
Development Initiatives?, 34 WM & MARY ENVTL. L.& POL’Y REV. 55, 73 (2009).
79. Id. at 77.
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the foundation for nearly every GHG standard and program in the world. 80
The GHG Protocol introduced the concept of different “scopes” of
emissions. 81 Scope 1 refers to direct emissions from a facility (e.g., from a
building’s boiler or furnace, or from a vehicle used on-site). 82 Scope 2
refers to emissions from purchased electricity, heat, or steam produced offsite (for example, emissions from the generation of electricity purchased by
the building). 83 Scope 3 refers to other “indirect” emissions, and would
include the travel-demand-related emissions discussed above. 84
The transportation section above discussed methods for estimating
these Scope 3 emissions, 85 but Scopes 1 and 2 are actually far easier to
calculate. Scope 1 involves simply applying emissions factors to any fuels
combusted on-site, 86 information that is available in any building’s records
and could be estimated for a new development based on comparable
structures. Scope 2 involves applying local or supplier-specific emissions
factors to metered electricity consumption. 87 These calculations are more
straightforward than the travel demand forecasting done routinely by local
jurisdictions trying to estimate road infrastructure needs. To help
jurisdictions and others establish a method for making and compiling these
project-level calculations, the GHG Protocol produced a report focused on
estimating reductions from projects (as opposed to emissions at a corporate
or institutional level). 88
3. Proposed Frameworks for Calculating an Emissions Fee
The authors are not aware of any jurisdictions that have imposed a fee
on a development project to mitigate its GHG emissions. However, the
consideration of a few alternative approaches suggests one potential
methodology.
It might be tempting for a jurisdiction to attempt to quantify the
societal cost of GHG emissions, and then charge the developer this amount.
The appeal of this approach is that it could truly internalize the full cost of
the emissions released by a given development, often stated as the goal of
80. About
the
GHG
Protocol,
GREENHOUSE
GAS
PROTOCOL,
http://www.ghgprotocol.org/about-ghgp (last visited Dec. 16, 2015).
81. GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL, A CORPORATE ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING
STANDARD 25 (rev. ed. 2004), http://www.ghgprotocol.org/files/ghgp/public/ghg-protocolrevised.pdf.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See supra Part III.C.1.
86. GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL, supra note 81, at 42.
87. Id.
88. GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL, THE GHG PROTOCOL FOR PROJECT ACCOUNTING (2005),
http://www.ghgprotocol.org/files/ghgp/ghg_project_protocol.pdf.
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development fees. 89 Such estimates are used for other purposes, too. For
example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and other federal
agencies use a “social cost of carbon” to estimate the climate benefits of
rulemakings. 90 This amount is used to estimate the economic damages
associated with a small increase in carbon dioxide emissions, as well as the
benefit of a small decrease in emissions. 91 It is intended to be a
comprehensive figure, including among other impacts “changes in net
agricultural productivity, human health, [and] property damages from
increased flood risk.” 92 Although the figure “very likely” underestimates
the true damages caused by emissions, 93 it would be hard to argue that the
local jurisdiction bears all of these costs and therefore that there is a clear
nexus between this level of fee and the local government interest harmed by
the development. For example, there may not be any agriculture in the
community. There is also considerable debate about what the appropriate
level of the social cost of carbon should be, and the issue is very politically
charged. 94 For these reasons, while the social cost of carbon may be the
right measure for nationwide emissions mitigation strategies, it may not be
the best fit for calculating local development fees.
An alternative approach would involve quantifying the emissions
resulting from a given project and then identifying the local cost to achieve
the same level of reduction. Focusing on matching the level of emissions
mitigation to the level of emissions increase avoids the challenging
economic modeling exercise and maintains a clear nexus. There may still
be some uncertainty in the calculation: project costs may vary within the
jurisdiction, or based on the size or type of project, and calculations will
have to assume a baseline level of emissions that would have occurred in
the absence of the project. However, these baseline calculations are
frequently made for local Climate Action Plans, and the fee must only be
89. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013)
(“Insisting that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their conduct is a hallmark of
responsible land-use policy . . . .”).
90. The Social Cost of Carbon, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Dec. 11, 2015),
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/economics/scc.html.
91. Id.
92. Id.
CHANGE
2007:
SYNTHESIS
REPORT
69
(2008),
93. IPCC,
CLIMATE
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_full_report.pdf.
94. In 2013, the White House revised the value it uses for the social cost of carbon and was
met with political pushback from all sides. Environmental groups argued the value was too low,
and industry groups argued that the process was too opaque and the result too uncertain. See, e.g.,
PETER HOWARD, OMITTED DAMAGES: WHAT’S MISSING FROM THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON
(2014),
http://costofcarbon.org/files/Omitted_Damages_Whats_Missing_From_the_Social_Cost_of_Carb
on.pdf; Andrew Childers, Putting a Social Price on Carbon. Is $37 a Ton Adequate?,
BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY & ENV’T BLOG (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.bna.com/putting-socialprice-b17179882522/.
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roughly proportional (not a “precise mathematical calculation”). 95
Therefore, the fee does not have to match the cost of mitigation precisely,
and this approach allows the jurisdiction to estimate a reasonable local cost
and determine fees accordingly. (To meet the requirement under Dolan that
there be an “individualized determination,” 96 jurisdictions should also
ensure that even within the context of a broadly applied fee program, a
process is available for review of individual cases. 97)
B. Climate Exactions for Climate Adaptation
In the adaptation context, a climate exaction could take multiple forms.
Most simply, it could require that existing environmental impact fees take
into account the effect that climate change will have on the relevant impact
(for example, quantifying a project’s impact based on projections of future
sea-level rise at the property site rather than using historical projections). A
more challenging but valuable version of this strategy would also quantify
and mitigate any loss in adaptive capacity caused by the development, such
as, for example, a project that made it harder for a wetland to migrate with
rising sea levels.
1. Demonstrating Essential Nexus for an Adaptation Fee
A mitigation fee approach is already used to require developers
causing a loss of wetlands to mitigate the loss on- or off-site, and fees in
lieu of mitigation may be imposed. 98 This was, in fact, the type of
monetary exaction at issue in Koontz—Mr. Koontz was given the option to
improve wetlands off-site in exchange for permission to fill the wetlands
property he proposed to develop. 99 Adaptation to climate change is
generally not currently the stated purpose for existing wetlands
mitigation—the requirement comes from the Clean Water Act’s concern for
the “integrity of the Nation’s waters” 100 and from state wetlands laws—but
one can imagine an additional rationale for the same program based on
mitigating the loss of the community’s capacity to adapt to increased storm
water. While the Court found in Mr. Koontz’s favor, it was not because a
local government may not impose a wetlands mitigation fee; rather, the
95. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
96. Id.
97. SARAH L. COFFIN, SERENA M. WILLIAMS & PAUL F. MUETHING III, CTR. FOR ENVTL.
POL’Y & MGMT. ENVTL. FIN. CTR., MANAGING GROWTH WITH FAIRNESS: THE REGULATORY
TAKINGS TEST OF SMART GROWTH POLICIES, PRACTICE GUIDE #2, at 12 (2002),
https://louisville.edu/cepm/pg-2.
98. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-843-F-08-002, WETLANDS COMPENSATORY
MITIGATION,
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201508/documents/compensatory_mitigation_factsheet.pdf.
99. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2593 (2013).
100. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 98.
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Court wanted the jurisdiction to go through the exercise of applying
constitutional takings tests to the condition it imposed. 101 The strategy is
valid as long as this demonstration is made, and it is not hard to imagine
jurisdictions applying a similar fee for other measures designed to maintain
a community’s adaptive capacity by offsetting loss of capacity caused by a
project with increased capacity close by. Development that decreases a
community’s resilience to climate change, for example, by removing
shoreline protections from flooding or decreasing tree canopy that provides
cooling, could be mitigated with activities elsewhere in the community that
increase resilience to these impacts. The nexus between the impact and the
fee spent to offset the impact seems clear.
2. Demonstrating Rough Proportionality for an Adaptation Fee
Quantifying a project’s impact to demonstrate that a fee is roughly
proportional may be more challenging—adaptive measures raise additional
complications regarding timing and uncertainty of future projections. In
California, the Coastal Commission already charges mitigation fees to
offset the impacts of private seawalls on beaches. For example, owners of
the Ocean Harbor House Condominium in Monterey, California requested a
permit to build a 585-foot seawall to protect the complex. 102 As a condition
of the permit, the Coastal Commission imposed a $2.15 million beach
impact fee and dedication of public beach access through a parking lot in
the complex. 103 In this case, the Coastal Commission determined the
amount of the beach fee by calculating the historical rate of erosion at the
site, and the estimated recreational value of the beach that would be lost
because of impacts to the beach caused by the seawall. 104 The court upheld
this fee, holding that it passed both the Nollan essential nexus test and the
Dolan rough proportionality test. 105
In an adaptation context, however, regulators may need to reconsider
how they calculate the beach fee in the following ways:
(1) Erosion rates are likely to increase as sea levels rise, so regulators
may need to project future erosion rates over the life of the project to
adequately mitigate the impacts.
(2) In addition to recreational benefits, beaches and natural shorelines
provide important flood risk reduction benefits that will become

101. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597–98.
102. Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Ass’n v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 432,
43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
103. Id. at 439.
104. Id. at 437.
105. Id. at 450.
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increasingly important to communities as the climate changes. 106 These
natural resources will be increasingly degraded over time as sea levels rise.
Where we put development in the way, these resources will be unable to
migrate inland and keep pace with rising seas and those will be gradually
eroded and lost.
Regulators should account for ways that climate change will affect the
currently calculated impacts (e.g., recreation) of a development in the
future, as well as how the project may exacerbate future risks of climate
change impacts to neighboring properties. As this example shows, rough
proportionality for adaptation, (which is inherently forward-looking), may
require more of a risk-mitigation analysis, which may be harder to calculate
and monetize than GHG emissions are. There is work to be done to
improve current tools and methodologies—for example, regulators will
need a scientifically sound analysis of how sea-level rise may affect erosion
rates over time—but the science in these areas is constantly progressing,
and unfortunately, we learn more about the value of avoiding risk each time
we see more damage from storms and sea-level rise. In any event, the
amount of an adaptation fee probably should be discounted to reflect that it
addresses climate harms that will occur at an uncertain time in the future.
Finally, as in the emissions discussion above, the requirement is only that
the jurisdiction demonstrate rough proportionality, not a precise
mathematical calculation.
IV. ADDRESSING CRITIQUES
We can anticipate some concerns about our proposal for climate
exactions. An immediate objection may be that such exactions would
unduly raise the costs of housing. The economics of exactions are complex,
but they do not always raise the cost of housing. When the measure of an
exaction is known to a developer before initiating a project, both logic and
empirical evidence suggest that, in general, the landowners will bear the
costs of the exaction because developers will pay the landowners less for
their land. 107 Lower prices for land may decrease the amount of land
available for development. But given that development of such a parcel
will impose costs on all from GHG emissions or weakened resilience, it
seems both efficient and fair for the exaction to discourage development of
the site.
In some circumstances, the costs of an exaction likely will be passed
on to purchasers in the form of higher real estate prices. 108 How one may
106. Florida recently enacted legislation authorizing local governments to consider sea-level
rise in their coastal management planning. FLA. ST. ANN. § 163.3178 (West 2015).
107. See Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE: A J. OF POL’Y
DEV. & RES. 139, 153 (2005).
108. See Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 211.
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evaluate this should vary, depending on whether or not the expenditures
made with the exacted funds benefit the specific site upon which the
exaction is imposed. If the expenditure does benefit the site, the higher
price paid will be appropriate because the development will be more
valuable due to the added public infrastructure. Thus, for example, if the
municipality funds a new zero-emission bus line to serve the burdened site,
the value of a home on that site will increase along with its price. However,
if the municipality funds the bus line elsewhere within the jurisdiction,
perhaps because it can serve more people there, then the cost of the
burdened parcel will rise without any increase in value, discouraging
development at that site. But this seems justified (assuming that the
expenditure choice was made for good reasons, such as too little density
near the burdened site), because climate policy justifies discouraging
development at a site that will create large new emissions. Providing the
bus line in the denser part of the jurisdiction will make land and existing
housing there more valuable and may encourage new development where
climate impacts will be less.
Some may express concern that local governments are not the proper
level of government to impose regulations directed at reducing GHG
emissions from motor vehicles. Of course, the federal government has
exclusive authority to regulate emissions from motor vehicles, with the
notable statutory exception for California, and co-regulates emissions from
power plants along with the states. 109 But local land use regulations do not
regulate tailpipe or building emissions or gas mileage. Rather, they are the
chief tool available to reduce vehicle miles traveled, which has an obvious
and independent effect on emissions. Moreover, local governments possess
the initiative for providing transportation alternatives to automobiles,
through providing bicycle and pedestrian options and developing public
transit (even if federal funding is often necessary), and they implement the
building codes that drive the energy consumption of new buildings. In
addition, preparing for the impacts of climate change is an inherently local
concern, as sea-level rise, increased storms, or urban heat will affect each
jurisdiction according to its own location and presence of features to
mitigate these effects. There seems to be no reasonable argument that
climate exactions or other land use regulations aimed at reducing emissions
or responding to the impacts of climate change are preempted by federal
law. 110 On the contrary, the Supreme Court has often stated that land use
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7543 (2012).
110. In American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court held
“that the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law right
to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.” 131 S. Ct.
2527, 2537 (2011). Although the Court did not address whether the Clean Air Act also preempts
state claims based on GHG emissions, id. at 2540, other courts have held that it does not. E.g.,
Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734 F.3d 188, 190 (3d Cir. 2013). But even if the Clean Air
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regulation is primarily entrusted to state and local governments and has
even read federal authority narrowly to preserve local authority. 111
Similarly, the reality that climate change is a planetary problem,
meaning that local emissions contribute to harm globally, should not
preclude local efforts to reduce local emissions. Local emissions contribute
to aggregate global emissions, which impose both global and local harms.
Local governments have jurisdiction over local land development; no global
entity can address emissions from such local development. Climate
exactions do not attempt to regulate any economic activity outside of the
regulating jurisdiction; for example, they neither discriminate against nor
burden interstate commerce. 112
Emissions reductions achieved by one local government can become
pointless if other localities continue to grow emissions at historic levels.
Nonetheless, localities are the chief governments that can reduce emissions
from land use patterns. Fragmentation of land use authority is a familiar
problem creating many inefficiencies; climate exactions would not pose a
unique challenge. Local government initiatives such as climate exactions
may even lead to broader collaboration on difficult climate problems,
because local governments motivated to address climate issues will not
place themselves at a short-term comparative economic disadvantage if
acting in concert with other localities. In addition, coordination of climate
land use regulations within metropolitan regions, among states, and even
internationally could create a more efficient regulatory structure with
greater benefits. For example, concern about climate change has led to
novel efforts among states and localities to coordinate land use and other
policies to adapt to climate change and effect greater reductions of

Act does preempt state and federal tort claims against power plants, the scope of the Act’s
preemption would not reach local land use regulations, because the Clean Air Act only preempts
state action to the extent that the EPA is regulating at the national level. Current EPA GHG
regulations under the CAA address vehicle tailpipe emission rates and power plant emission rates,
not land-use patterns that lead to greater use of fuels. In contrast, other state actions have been
expressly preempted by the Clean Air Act. For example, states are prevented from adopting or
attempting to enforce standards relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or
new motor vehicle engines, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a), although even in this case, the Act also explicitly
allows the state of California to seek a waiver to this provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b), and allows
other states to adopt California’s standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7507.
111. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 174 (2001) (finding that construction of Clean Water Act to permit federal jurisdiction over
abandoned sand and gravel pit “would result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional
and primary power over land and water use”); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans–Hudson Corp., 513 U.S.
30, 44 (1994).
112. Cf. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014) (finding that California low carbon fuel standard does not
discriminate against interstate commerce).
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GHGs. 113 Successful climate policy measures often bubble up from lower
levels of government rather than emerge from top down directives. 114
An environmentalist may complain that climate exactions are an
inadequate response to climate problems because they permit new
developments even when they exacerbate emissions and weaken resiliency
so long as the developer can pay the fee. But climate exactions achieve
what economists have long advocated—putting a price on carbon. 115 Thus,
climate exactions should discourage developments where the welfare
benefits from development fail to exceed the social costs of climate harms,
so long as the costs of the new developments are accurately calculated—a
serious issue, which we address below. This balancing of costs and benefits
is likely to be more politically sustainable than an outright prohibition of
categories of development, because it acknowledges that other values
sometimes will outweigh climate concerns.
Importantly, when
development does occur, payment of the exaction will provide the
government with funds that can be used to mitigate climate harms. For
example, a local government can spend the proceeds of a climate exaction
on public transit, which can permanently reduce the community’s overall
carbon emissions, or on coastal lands, permitting wetlands or beaches to
migrate inland with sea-level rise.
V. CALIFORNIA: A COMPELLING CANDIDATE FOR CLIMATE EXACTIONS
In addition to the constitutional permissibility of climate exactions, a
key question is whether a jurisdiction has the legal and technical capacity to
undertake this approach. Some recent developments may enhance such
capacity. Environmental protection statutes at the state and federal level
look likely to provide tools for a jurisdiction to impose a GHG mitigation
fee. 116 For example, the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)
requires all federal agencies to assess the environmental impacts of major
113. See, e.g., SOUTHEAST FLORIDA REGIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE COMPACT,
http://www.southeastfloridaclimatecompact.org/; TRANSPORTATION AND CLIMATE INITIATIVE OF
THE NORTHEAST AND MID-ATLANTIC STATES, http://www.transportationandclimate.org (last
visited Jan. 31. 2016).
114. For example, efforts to enact comprehensive climate legislation in the U.S. Congress did
not succeed, and current federal vehicle GHG standards build on standards established by
California and followed by other states under § 177 of the Clean Air Act; likewise, the Clean
Power Plan recently finalized by the EPA builds on existing state-level limits on emissions from
power plants.
115. In 1997, 2500 economists, including Kenneth Arrow, William Nordhaus, and Joseph
Stigletz, endorsed a statement calling for a mechanism to put a price on carbon to address climate
change. The Economists’ Statement on Climate Change, Redefining Progress,
http://rprogress.org/publications/1997/econstatement.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
116. See, e.g., Michael B. Gerrard, Climate Change and the Environmental Impact Review
Process, 22 NAT. RES. & ENV’T, Winter 2008, at 20, 24 (discussing the extent to which state and
federal environmental reviews consider climate change in their analyses).
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federal actions significantly affecting the environment, 117 and this includes
local transportation projects that receive federal funding or permits. 118 In
2010, the White House Council on Environmental Quality released draft
guidance for incorporating GHG emissions and climate change impacts into
the NEPA analysis and evaluating options for mitigating the impacts, 119
updated in 2014 to incorporate federal land and resource management
activities. 120 Their finalization would begin to standardize assessment of
the emissions and climate impacts of federal (or federally funded) projects,
and may give localities translatable tools for quantifying and mitigating
emissions. In addition, some state environmental policy acts also
incorporate climate change explicitly, 121 and perhaps these states are well
suited to taking the first steps toward local development policies to reduce
emissions.
The State of California might be an excellent place to explore climate
exactions, for a number of reasons. First, California is one of the states
with its own state-level environmental protection statute (the California
Environmental Quality Act, or “CEQA”). 122 CEQA does not independently
authorize a jurisdiction to impose exactions on developers, but it does
provide that:
[a] lead agency for a project has authority to require feasible
changes in any or all activities involved in the project in order to
substantially lessen or avoid significant effects on the
environment, consistent with applicable constitutional
requirements such as the ‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’
standards established by case law. 123
Most importantly, in 2007, California passed legislation requiring the
governor’s office to develop guidelines for the incorporation of GHGs into
CEQA analyses. 124 Regulations followed in 2009, and include a number of

117. National Envtl. Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2012).
118. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2015).
119. Consideration of the Effects of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 75 Fed.
Reg. 8046 (Feb. 18, 2010).
120. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, GUIDANCE: FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES ON
CONSIDERATION OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN
NEPA REVIEWS (Dec. 24, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CEQ-20140004-0001.
121. EIA Guidelines for Assessing the Impact of a Project on Climate Change, SABIN CENTER
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-change/resources/nepa-andstate-nepa-eis-resource-center/environmental-assessment-protocols-consideration-climatechange#State Guidelines (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
122. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–165 (West 2007).
123. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15041(a) (2015).
124. S.B. 97, 2007 Leg., 2007–08 Sess. (Cal. 2007), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/0708/bill/sen/sb_0051-0100/sb_97_bill_20070824_chaptered.pdf.
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relevant provisions. 125
California agencies must analyze the GHG
emissions of proposed projects and reach a conclusion regarding the
significance of those emissions. 126 The analysis must include the project’s
potential energy use, including transportation-related energy, and ways to
reduce energy demand, including through the use of efficient transportation
alternatives; 127 agencies also must consider potential mitigation measures to
reduce those emissions. 128 Agencies may streamline the analysis by using a
programmatic GHG emissions reduction plan. 129 A GHG mitigation fee
would be well aligned with this direction to consider mitigation measures,
particularly if the fee were included in a local climate action plan, allowing
for streamlining of the CEQA analysis. Likewise, California’s Coastal
Commission has led the way in attempts to mitigate the environmental
impact of development on the coast, using strategies like monetary
exactions, as with the beach impact fee example discussed above. 130
California has extensive experience with development impact fees, guided
since 1987 by the state’s Mitigation Fee Act, which identifies the legal
requirements of fees. 131
Second, California has a particularly acute local government funding
challenge. Proposition 13, 132 enacted in 1978, drastically limited the property
tax that local governments collect on properties, increasing jurisdictions’
dependence on other sources of revenue, including development fees. 133 This
leads the state to consider sources of revenue that others may not. In 2014,
California’s then-Senate majority leader proposed a carbon tax on
transportation fuels, 134 although he later shifted the proposal to focus instead
on revenue from the state’s GHG cap-and-trade program. 135 The GHG
mitigation fee would create a new funding source for emissions reduction or
climate adaptation projects.

125. CEQA and Climate Change, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING & RES.,
http://www.opr.ca.gov/s_ceqaandclimatechange.php (last visited Dec. 23, 2015).
126. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15064.4 (2015).
127. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, app. F.
128. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15126.4(c).
129. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15183.5(b).
130. See supra Part III.D.3.
131. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 66000–08 (West 2009).
132. CAL. CONST. art. 13A.
133. See, e.g., JEFFREY I. CHAPMAN, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., PROPOSITION 13: SOME
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 11 (1998) (discussing the “fiscalization of land use”),
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/op/OP_998JCOP.pdf.
134. Marc Lifsher, State Senate Leader Proposes ‘Carbon Tax’ on Motor Vehicle Fuels, L.A.
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/2014/feb/20/business/la-fi-carbon-tax-proposal20140221.
135. Steinberg
Backs
Off
‘Carbon
Tax’,
ABC
10
(Apr.
14,
2014),
http://www.news10.net/story/news/politics/2014/04/14/steinberg-backs-off-carbon-tax/7712703/.
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Finally, California has already been a leader on the development of
innovative laws and policies to address climate change. 136 It is the first state in
the country to enact a cap on GHGs across all sectors of the economy. 137 It has
also enacted a novel law known as S.B. 375, requiring the state to set regional
targets for GHG reductions from passenger vehicles, and requiring
metropolitan planning organizations to prepare a Sustainable Communities
Strategy (“SCS”) as part of their Regional Transportation Plans.138 The SCS
must be adequate to meet the GHG reduction targets, if implemented, but there
is no requirement to implement the plans.139 There are, however, incentives to
encourage implementation, for example, providing developers relief from
CEQA requirements if the project is consistent with the SCS.140 S.B. 375
could also provide a framework for establishing GHG mitigation fees—a
jurisdiction interested in the approach could incorporate the strategy into its
SCS. The fee could, in turn, provide the mechanism to implement the plan and
achieve the goals of S.B. 375, rather than stopping at the planning stage for lack
of funding. At the same time, the approach would offer developers a
streamlined approval process, thanks to the incentives provided in the
legislation.
Another recently proposed state bill, S.B. 1, would have supported
S.B. 375 by authorizing the creation of Sustainable Communities
Investment Authorities and use of a strategy known as “tax increment
financing” in defined Sustainable Communities Investment Areas. 141 The
bill passed both houses of the state legislature, but met with considerable
political opposition that characterized the bill as an attempt by the state to
take land use decisions away from local governments, or by local
governments to vest too much power in the hands of unelected Authority
members. 142 Governor Brown did not sign the bill, and he vetoed a similar
136. The political elements contributing to California’s strong support for policies addressing
climate change are analyzed insightfully in Eric Biber, Cultivating a Green Political Climate:
Lessons for Climate Change Policy from the Defeat of California’s Proposition 23, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 399 (2013).
137. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, A.B. 32, 2006 Leg., 2005-06 Sess.
(Cal.
2006),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_00010050/ab_32_bill_20060927_chaptered.pdf. For information on the Act’s primacy, see Lampert,
supra note 32, at 193.
138. Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008, S.B. 375, 2008 Leg.,
2007-08
Sess.
(Cal.
2008),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/sen/sb_03510400/sb_375_bill_20080930_chaptered.pdf.
139. Sustainable Communities, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY AIR RES. BD.,
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/sb375/sb375.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
140. Id.
141. Sustainable Communities Investment Authority Act, S.B. 1, 2013 Leg., 2013–14 Sess.
(Cal. 2013), http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140SB1.
142. See, e.g., Stephen Frank, Senate Bill 1: Good Bye California Republic, Hello California
‘Soviet Socialist’ Republic or the ‘CSSR’ for Short, AGENDA 21 RADIO (Aug. 12, 2013),
http://agenda21radio.com/?p=697; Lawrence J. McQuillan, Good News! SB 1 Dies (For Now),
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version of the bill in 2012. 143 Emissions mitigation fees would likely find
their own political opposition just as S.B. 1 did, but they would remain in
the hands of local officials and planners, which might make them more
politically palatable than more state-driven approaches.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The imposition of fees on developers to mitigate GHG emissions
offers several benefits to local governments concerned with meeting the
Nollan and Dolan tests. First, contrary to concerns that applying these tests
to monetary exactions would be an excessive burden, it may actually be
easier to apply these tests to monetary fees (which have an explicit value)
than to physical dedications of property, whose value may be harder to
calculate and demonstrate as roughly proportional. Second, GHGs provide
a convenient, consistent metric for which there are standard methodologies
to calculate. Based on this analysis, there is no constitutional barrier to local
governments imposing a fee on developments in order to mitigate GHG
emissions. 144 There may still be state-level restrictions or guidelines, as in
California’s Mitigation Fee Act, and a fee enabling act may be required.
However, that does not mean that other barriers do not exist—for example,
political opposition to fees or support for increased local development may
weigh against the policy.
A. Challenges
In difficult economic times, jurisdictions are often wary of not being
sufficiently welcoming of new development. Rather than imposing new
fees, some jurisdictions are waiving or deferring existing impact fees as an
economic development strategy. 145 Political inertia is a factor as well, and
INDEP.
INST.,
THE
BEACON
(Sept.
25,
2013,
5:26
PM),
http://blog.independent.org/2013/09/25/good-news-sb-1-dies-for-now/.
143. Damien Newton, Gov. Brown Could Sign Bill to Help Finance Sustainable Development
in CA, STREETSBLOG (Aug. 9, 2013), http://la.streetsblog.org/2013/08/09/gov-brown-couldsign-bill-to-help-finance-sustainable-development-inca/.
144. Another legal objection to climate exactions may be based on the judicial doctrine
followed in some states that an expenditure of a monetary exaction must directly benefit the land
charged for the impact fee. See, e.g., Volusia Cty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.
2d 126 (Fla. 2000). While these states apply the rule to impact fees for construction of public
capital projects, they do not seem to apply the rule to monetary exactions designed to mitigate
environmental harms. Even if they did, climate exactions to mitigate emissions do directly benefit
residents of the burdened development as much as other residents of the jurisdiction. For
exactions to address loss of adaptive resilience, however, the analysis might be more complicated,
requiring the adaptation measures to benefit the burdened residents, so that, for example,
investments in berms or other living shorelines features to increase the community’s adaptive
capacity would need to protect and serve the development, although not exclusively.
145. See, e.g., Development Impact Fee Deferral Program, CITY OF ELK GROVE,
http://www.elkgrovecity.org/city_hall/departments_divisions/economic_development/incentive_p
rograms/development_impact_fee_deferral_program (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
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the GHG mitigation fee idea is a relatively new one. Others have proposed
greater use of impact fees to deal with environmental problems, 146 but the
strategy is not in wide use, as it is for traffic mitigation. In addition, climate
change itself is controversial. Although GHGs may provide a more
transparent method for connecting new development to the need for
alternative transportation infrastructure, it may be more expedient
politically to stick with traffic impacts as the basis for the fee, if only to
avoid a political battle over climate change.
B. Opportunities
On the other hand, jurisdictions interested in adopting strategies to
address GHG emissions should consider a mitigation fee placed on new
development. It provides a source of funding for implementation of climate
goals, and ties the cost for any given development only to the impact of that
specific development. The funding aspect of this strategy is worth
additional emphasis—to the extent that state and federal gasoline taxes fund
transportation projects, those sources of funds are already inadequate to
meet spending obligations, 147 and will decline even further if climate
change policies reduce GHG emissions by decreasing fuel consumption. 148
Transportation departments are searching for alternative sources of revenue,
but many of these (e.g., a fee on vehicle miles traveled) are also politically
challenging. 149 A GHG mitigation fee would put the power to manage
GHGs—and to pay for them—in the hands of local governments.
There is no question that society must find a way to reduce GHG
emissions in order to lessen the impact of climate change, and that engagement
by all levels of government will be necessary. While federal and state
governments may be best suited to address emissions from power plants or
regulate vehicle fuel economy, land use strategies will have to be implemented
at the local level, as they always are. There is good reason to get started on
these strategies quickly: the latest report on mitigation measures from the
146. See, e.g., James C. Nicholas & Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, Market Based Approaches
to Environmental Preservation: To Environmental Mitigation Fees and Beyond, 43 NAT. RES. J.
837, 846 (2003).
147. CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE HIGHWAY TRUST FUND AND THE TREATMENT OF SURFACE
TRANSPORTATION
PROGRAMS
IN
THE
FEDERAL
BUDGET
5
(2014),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/45416TransportationScoring.pdf.
148. See, e.g., Pacyniak et al., Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Transportation:
Opportunities in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CENTER 15 (2015).
http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/www.georgetownclimate.org/files/GCCReducing_GHG_Emissions_from_Transportation-11.24.15.pdf.
149. Road Pricing Defined: Vehicle-Miles Traveled (VMT) Fees, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED.
HIGHWAY
ADMIN.,
https://web.archive.org/web/20150908002219/https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/revenue/road_pricin
g/defined/vmt.aspx (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change notes that “[i]nfrastructure
developments and long-lived products that lock societies into GHG-intensive
emissions pathways may be difficult or very costly to change, reinforcing the
importance of early action for ambitious mitigation.”150 Fortunately, some
local jurisdictions are taking it upon themselves to establish GHG emissions
reduction goals and plans to achieve them. 151 One option for achieving
these goals might be the adoption of a GHG mitigation fee on new
developments, and the approach is both legally and technically viable.
Given the Koontz decision, the safest approach for a jurisdiction is to
design a fee program that applies to developers broadly rather than ad hoc,
as well as to meet the Nollan and Dolan tests. This approach should be
workable in the case of GHG emissions mitigation given the availability of
standardized quantification tools and methodologies. Framing the fee in the
context of a comprehensive climate plan or goal can help ground the
strategy in terms of the government’s interest, and in the case of California,
can both support compliance with and streamline review under statewide
environmental statutes.
Jurisdictions that may have struggled to justify transportation impact
fees based on other metrics may find that applying a GHG emissions lens to
the analysis reveals both an essential nexus and a rough proportionality that
might otherwise be difficult to demonstrate. However, political challenges
with a fee explicitly based on GHGs may argue against such an approach,
and as other travel metrics become more widely used, it may be easier to
avoid the explicit climate change discussion.
Nevertheless, some
jurisdictions welcome that discussion—some, particularly those in
California, are even required to have it. For these communities interested in
being first, a GHG mitigation fee may offer a viable strategy to address
emissions reductions in local land use decisionmaking.

150. IPCC,
SUMMARY
FOR
POLICYMAKERS
18
(2014),
http://report.mitigation2014.org/spm/ipcc_wg3_ar5_summary-for-policymakers_approved.pdf.
151. See, e.g., C40 CITIES, http://www.c40.org/cities (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).

